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Abstract: 
Liberalism is increasingly applied in explaining post-Cold War India-Pakistan relations. It is 
argued that both the nations have cultivated liberal values, resulting in complex 
interdependence and peace in their mutual relationship. The existence of different regimes as 
the Indus Waters Treaty, regional trade regime of SAPTA and SAFTA, CBMs and gas regime 
of TAPI and IPI, are referred to as liberal trends in their IR. However, this article contends such 
a view as naïve and idealistic. India and Pakistan are trapped in an unending security dilemma 
manifested by 3 major and one minor war, border disputes, alleged mutual interventions and 
the arms race. It argues that India-Pakistan relationship doesn’t lend itself to the democratic 
peace thesis, trade-brings-peace theory, multilateralism and international regimes. First, a brief 
overview of liberalism is followed by its application to India-Pakistan relations. Subsequently, 
a critique of realism is presented and placed in the context of India-Pakistan relations. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Different theories remain dominant in different times and contexts. A theory wins dominance 
through its intellectual debates with other theories and its effectiveness in explaining the 
dominant trend of international events of the time. 1   Liberalism remained dominant in 
explaining the post-World War First European international politics, certain Cold War 
European liberal economic and political transformations and post-Cold War international 
relations in general. Realism remained dominant when Europe braced for World War Second 
and prevailed through Cold War till the fall of Berlin wall. It implies that when men displayed 
altruism, reason, morality and progress and peace ensued, liberalism prevailed. On the contrary, 
whenever man displayed egoism, selfishness, and lust, resulting in war and retrogression, 
realism have prevailed.2  In other words, with the change in international political dynamics 
and behavior of states, theoretical perspectives also change. Such a change in the application of 
theoretical perspectives is explained by former US president, Bill Clinton when he stated in the 
twilight of Cold War that “In a world where freedom, not tyranny, is on the march, the cynical 
calculus of pure power politics simply does not compute. It is ill-suited to the new era”.3   
The world at present represents a complex picture of socio-political and economic disparities at 
different regional levels. There are regions with democratic form of governments, economically 
integrated under free-trade arrangements and mature regional organizations making states 
complexly interdependent and their sovereignties diminished. On the contrary, there are regions 
still depicting international relations of the early twentieth century Europe. South Asia is a 
region of the later type.  In the contemporary world, the proverbial Machiavellian men and 
Hobbesian anarchy of “war of all against all” where life is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and 
short”4 sit at the heart of the political situation of South Asia. 
However, with theoretical pluralism in the 1990s and the peaceful demise of Cold War, 
liberalism is widely applied in explaining international relations of different regions. Such 
application of liberalism is without taking into account the nature and context of different 
relations. Owing to such widespread popularity of liberalism, the same is applied in explaining 
the regional dynamics of south Asia as well. India-Pakistan relations are also explained through 
the paradigm of liberalism. It is argued that both the nations have cultivated liberal values, 
resulting in complex interdependence and peace in their mutual relationship. The existence of 
different regimes as the Indus Waters Treaty, regional trade regime of SAPTA and SAFTA, 
CBMs and gas regime of TAPI and IPI, are referred to as liberal trends in their IR. However, 
                                                 
1 Scott Burchill, et al., eds. Theories of International Relations. 3rd ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 9. 
2Charles W. Kegley and Eugene R. Wittkopf, World Politics: Trend and Transformation. 9th ed. (USA: Cengage 
Learning, 2003), 39.    
3 Kegley and  Wittkopf, World politics, 43. 
4 Thomas Hobbes, “Of Man, Being the First Part of Leviathan. Vol. XXXIV, Part 5. The Harvard Classics. (USA, 
New York: P.F. Collier & Son, 2001) 1909–14. 
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this article contends such a view as naïve and idealistic. India and Pakistan are trapped in an 
unending security dilemma manifested by 3 major and one minor war, border disputes, alleged 
mutual interventions and an arms race. It argues that India-Pakistan relationship doesn’t lend 
itself to the democratic peace thesis, trade-brings-peace theory, multilateralism and 
international regimes. First, a brief overview of liberalism is followed by its application to 
India-Pakistan relations. Subsequently, a critique of realism is presented and placed in the 
context of India-Pakistan relations. 
LIBERALISM 
Classical liberalism has three main brands: republican liberalism, commercial liberalism and 
liberal institutionalism.5  Republican liberalism (democratic peace) asserts that democracies 
almost never fight one another. It argues that “when the citizens who bear the burdens of war 
elect their government, wars become impossible”. 6  However, democracies incline to fight 
authoritarian states as the later has jingoistic, militaristic and expansionist tendencies due to 
“the greater weight of the military, high executive discretion and the complex politics of 
nationalism”. 7  The democratic peace thesis also holds that democracies are less prone to 
acquisition and use of nuclear weapons and that democracies are less vulnerable to civil 
conflict8   and terrorism9. Commercial liberalism (trade-brings-peace theory) contends that free 
trade brings prosperity and establishes peace. It brings prosperity through the theory of 
comparative advantage, competition and functional specialization and peace through 
interdependence and interconnectedness. Prosperity and interdependence facilitate peace as 
wars wreak havoc on trade and inflict heavy costs. Similarly, free trade helps realize mutual 
harmony of interests, softens fractious state boundaries, eradicates aggression, shifts and 
replaces parochial loyalties, and unifies individuals into a single community. 10   Liberal 
Institutionalism asserts that international institutions could bring peace through collective 
security.  
Neoliberalism as a variant in liberal school emerged in the 1990s. It concedes to realism in its 
believe in the state as the primary though not the only actor. It acknowledges international 
system as anarchic though tamable through international institutions and regimes, and thus 
cooperation achievable. The cooperation achieved is sustainable too, as cooperation generates 
                                                 
5Amitav Acharya, “Theoretical Perspectives on International Relations in Asia” (Paper presented at the 
Conference on International Relations in Asia: The New Regional System, George Washington University, 
Washington D.C, September 27-29, 2007).   
6 Burchill, Theories of International Relations, 59. 
7Stephan Haggard, “Liberal Pessimism: International Relations Theory and the Emerging Powers,” Asia & the 
Pacific Policy Studies 1 (1) (2014):7. 
8 Haggard, “Liberal Pessimism,”4. 
9Chenoweth, 2013 in Stephan Haggard, “Liberal Pessimism: International Relations Theory and the Emerging 
Powers,” Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies 1 (1) (2014):7. 
10 Burchill, Theories of International Relations, 63-64. 
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rewards which dilute selfish tendencies of states. Neoliberalism prioritizes national economic 
welfare over national security. It believes in an inside-out approach and considers the primary 
determinant of foreign policy as states’ intentions, information, ideals and interests. 11 
Neoliberals believe that states are concerned with maximization of ‘absolute gains’ and 
therefore cooperation possible.12  
Within the neoliberal school of thought “transnational interdependence” (complex 
interdependence) and “international regimes” are the two forerunner perspectives. Complex 
interdependence has three main assumptions. First, state is no more the dominant, coherent 
actor and its sovereignty is attenuated considerably. Second, states’ foreign policy goals are 
broadened to include low politics, non-military issues as well. Third, instruments of policy 
don’t remain confined to military capabilities. The world of complex interdependence of the 
1970s has now evolved into globalization. The later is the developed form of the former. 
Globalization has paved the way for free trade and diminished states’ economic and political 
sovereignty by diluting its citizen’s loyalties to their respective nation-states and 
internationalization of ecological, economic and security decisions.13   
International regimes stress that cooperation is possible under anarchy and that it could be and 
should be institutionalized.14  As regimes provide incentives, states’ divergent behavior and 
objectives converge and thereby reduces anarchy. 15  A hegemon is effective in the 
establishment and enforcement of a regime; however, it is not necessary for sustaining it.16  It is 
believed that regimes develop “a life of their own” due to frequent interactions of states and 
their stakes involved in it.17   In the same context, neoliberals believe that multilateralism can 
mould state attitude18 and prescribes multilateralism, military restraint and disarmament for 
peace. Liberals also believe that western liberal democracy and capitalism is the terminal point 
of the evolution of political and economic institutions faced with no serious post-Cold War 
challenges and that the rest of the world will follow suit.19   
 LIBERALISM IN INDIA-PAKISTAN RELATIONS 
                                                 
11David Baldwin, 1993, in Charles W. Kegley and Eugene R. Wittkopf, World Politics: Trend and Transformation. 
9th ed. (USA:Cengage Learning, 2003), 4-8.   
12 Burchill, Theories of International Relations, 65. 
13 Burchill, Theories of International Relations, 79-82. 
14 Burchill, Theories of International Relations, 64. 
15Luca Ratti, “Post-cold war Nato and international relations theory: The case for neo-classical realism,” Journal 
of Transatlantic Studies, 4:1, (2006):  86-87. 
16 Joshua S. Goldstein  and Jon C. Pevehouse, International Relations. 8th ed. (Delhi: Dorling Kindersley, 2009), 
89.  
17 Ratti, “Nato and international relations theory,” Journal of Transatlantic Studies, 86-87. 
18Amitav Acharya, “Theoretical Perspectives on International Relations in Asia” (Paper presented at the 
Conference on International Relations in Asia: The New Regional  System, George Washington University, 
Washington D.C, September  27-29,  2007). 
19 Burchill, Theories of International Relations, 56. 
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Generally, India is considered a democracy with a non-democratic period of 21 months in 
1975-77  and Pakistan a state hurtling towards democracy with long spells of military rules.  
Both the nations have fought 3 major wars (1948, 1965 and 1971), one half-war (the Kargil war 
of 1999) and are engaged in an expensive conventional and non-conventional arms race, border 
skirmishes, and alleged mutual interferences.  Both have gone nuclear in 1998 and are subject 
to domestic civil violence and terrorism. The wars of 1965 and 1971 qualify the democratic 
peace thesis as in both cases, an Indian democratic regime fought an authoritarian one in 
Pakistan. Similarly, a link has been established by liberals between democratization in Pakistan 
and rapprochement with India.20  Similarly, low level of civil strife and terrorism in democratic 
India and high level in Pakistan, particularly during the times of military rules under general 
Zia (1978-1988) and general Musharraf (2001-2008) confirms the assuaging effect of 
democracy on civil conflicts and terrorism.   
On the score of commercial liberalism, liberals point towards different liberal trends. India and 
Pakistan embarked upon economic liberalization in the 1990s and their mutual tariffs reduced 
from 225 % in 1988 to 25 % in 2005.21  India has granted Pakistan MFN status and Pakistan 
too is willing to have good trade relations with India for regional peace and stability.22  India–
Pakistan Chamber of Commerce and Industry has been established after Indian Prime Minister 
Vajpayee’s visit to Lahore in March 1999 and India by 2008 has become Pakistan’s ninth 
largest trading partner.23  Liberals are also sanguine that under WTO’s obligations both the 
states will further lower tariffs and remove quantitative restrictions and ultimately free trade 
will bring peace. Under the auspices of SAPTA (South Asian Preferential Trade Arrangement) 
and SAFTA (South Asian Free Trade Area), economic interdependence is an emerging trend in 
South Asia which is an omen of a cooperative security.24  Such trends provide a strong basis for 
the liberal standing of India-Pakistan relations.  
Classical liberal institutionalists are concerned more with collective security and to some extent 
with regional integration theory.25  According to them, UNO has played an effective role in 
Indo-Pak dispute mitigation. Similarly, the establishment of SAARC, the subsequent SAPTA 
and SAFTA, and the regional integration trends like the South Asian university, SAARC 
headquarter and secretariat,  under the umbrella of SAARC are noteworthy liberal strands in 
India-Pakistan IR. 
                                                 
20 Diehl, 2005 in Gautam Wahi, “The Common Futures of India and Pakistan:  A New Approach,” Journal of 
Futures Studies, 18(2), (2013):94. 
21 E. Sridharan, “Improving Indo-Pakistan relations: international relations theory, nuclear deterrence and 
possibilities for economic cooperation,” Contemporary South Asia, 14:3, (2005):327. 
22 The Times of India, 8 March 2008 in Bhumitra Chakma, “South Asia's Realist Fascination and the 
Alternatives,” Contemporary Security Policy, 30:3, (2009):407. 
23 Bhumitra Chakma, “South Asia's Realist Fascination and the Alternatives,” Contemporary Security Policy, 30:3, 
(2009):407. 
24 Chakma, “South Asia's Realist Fascination and the Alternatives,” 408. 
25 Acharya, “Theoretical Perspectives,” 13.  
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Neoliberals assert that technological revolution has resulted in increased interdependence and 
interconnectedness between India and Pakistan. The mounting influence of non-state actors like 
the terrorist and secessionist organizations in India and Pakistan26 and joint membership or 
observatory status and influence of IGOs like UNO, SAARC, SCO, ASEAN along with 
different MNCs and NGOs are eroding state sovereignties. The problems of environment, 
hitherto overshadowed by traditional security, are assuming importance.27 Not only are low 
politics issues coming to fore, but there is an increasing convergence of interest between the 
two states on climate change, and both are cooperating with WTO regime on the issues of 
patents in agriculture and livelihood cases.28  The internal crisis like terrorism in Pakistan, and 
corruption29 in India, along with the poverty and bad governance are gaining serious attentions.  
India and Pakistan are also employing non-military means of exerting influence as is 
exemplified by Track II and Track III diplomacy to generate goodwill, remove misconceptions 
and point the areas of mutual cooperation.30 Similarly, globalization is also playing a crucial 
role in changing the traditional rancor between India and Pakistan.  All these factors plead for 
the existence of complex interdependence between India and Pakistan.31  
The proponent of international regimes identifies SAPTA, SAFTA, and SAARC Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry as components of a trade regime, Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) of 1960, 
a water regime, Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) and Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) 
gas pipelines as the gas regime and CBMs regime. The trade regime is believed effective and is 
developing a life of its own. IWT is the regime that has sustained two total wars and a long cold 
war between India and Pakistan. Both the nations have stakes in the sustenance of the regime 
and is, therefore, functioning smoothly. Similar sanguine are liberals about the CBMs and the 
gas pipelines and its potential spillover effects of peace and prosperity.32   
Moreover, liberals argue that multilateralism has been employed in Indo-Pak relations on 
several occasions and has worked well as compared to bilateral approach. The conclusion of 
IWT in 1960 and the subsequent resolution of the disputes of Salal dam in the 1970s and 
Baglihar dam in 2007 are such success stories of multilateral efforts. The signing of the post-
                                                 
26 (Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) , Al-Qaeda, LeT and  Baluchistan Liberation Front (BLF) in Pakistan, Bajrang 
Dal, Shive Cena and the Naxalites  in India) 
27 Shaukat Hassan, Environmental Issues and Security in South Asia, Adelphi Paper No. 262 (London: 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1991) in Bhumitra Chakma, “South Asia's Realist Fascination and the 
Alternatives,” Contemporary Security Policy, 30:3, (2009):408. 
28 Gautam Wahi, “The Common Futures of India and Pakistan:  A New Approach,” Journal of Futures Studies, 
18(2), (2013):94. 
29 Anna Hazare, “Corruption (is) a bigger threat to India than Pakistan” (Bhatt, S. (2011).Rediff News. Retrieved 
11 10, 2012, from http://www.rediff.com/ news/slide-show/slide-show-1-corruption-a-bigger-threat-to-india-than-
pakistan-says-anna-hazare/20110406.htm) 
30 Stephen Philip Cohen, “India, Pakistan and Kashmir,” Journal of Strategic Studies, 25:4, (2002): 54-55. 
31 Wahi, “The Common Futures,” 94. 
32 Sridharan,  “Improving Indo-Pakistan relations,” 332. 
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1965 and 1971 wars agreements of Tashkent and Simla respectively, scaling down of the Kargil 
war of 1999 and diffusion of 2002 military standoff; all owes much to multilateralism.  
While realizing the biblical injunction of beating swords into ploughshares, both India and 
Pakistan intend to reduce their arms. Both have displayed military restraint on many occasions 
and are willing to dispose of their differences peacefully. Such liberal dispositions from the 
Indian side are frequently pointed out in Gandhian and Nehruvian philosophies of peaceful 
foreign policy, “Gujral doctrine” and the like. Proposals of “Joint Defense” of Ayub Khan and 
“Cricket Diplomacy” of president Zia are parallel historical liberal responses from the Pakistani 
side. Similar considerable are episodes of the “Lahore declaration” of February 1999, the India-
Pakistan comprehensive peace building process of 2003 and the Composite Dialogue Process 
(CDP) of 2004 and onward.33    
Lastly, liberals argue that India and Pakistan are toeing the western track in its evolution 
towards the terminal form of liberal democracy and capitalist economy. India is already 
charmed as the largest democracy of the world. Pakistan at present, with its military committed 
to the profession of soldiering, judicial independence, freedom and proliferation of media and 
awareness and vigilance of the masses, is claimed to have reached the point of no return to its 
previous spells of military rules. Similarly, both India and Pakistan are complying with the 
liberal trade regimes of WTO, IMF and WB and are further liberalizing and capitalizing their 
economies. 
CRITIQUE OF REALISM 
However, the liberal trends discussed above are considered naïve and idealistic by the realists.  
The democratic peace thesis  
The democratic peace thesis has been insufficiently discussed and applied in Asia due to 
“illiberal variety” of Asian democracies.34  Instead “authoritarian peace” thesis, the anti-thesis 
of democratic peace thesis, is debated and applied in Asian IR. 35 According to realists, India-
Pakistan relations disqualify both the theses. Critiquing the democratic peace thesis, realists 
believe that India is a well-established democracy and Pakistan’s government is democratic 
when ruled by a civvy, and authoritarian when ruled by the military. With such generalizations, 
the wars of 1948 and 1999 disqualify the primary premises of republican liberalism as in these 
two cases, two democratic governments were up in arms against one another. Realists contend 
that since 1979, different non-Congress leaders like Morarji Desai, Inder Kumar Gujral and 
Vajpayee adopted conciliatory approaches towards Pakistan. Counter to the democratic peace 
argument, Pakistan’s democratic governments under Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif 
                                                 
33 Narayanan, “The India -Pakistan Dyad,” 182. 
34 Acharya , “Theoretical Perspectives,”  12. 
35 Acharya , “Theoretical Perspectives,”  13. 
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reciprocated with hawkish policy towards India especially after 1989 intifada in Kashmir.36  
Similarly, during the term of the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA), India-Pakistan 
relations went through different phases: the nuclear-weapons tests of 1998, the Lahore 
Declaration of 1999, the Kargil “half war” of 1999, the failure of the Agra talks with General 
Pervez Musharraf in 2001, the attack on the Indian parliament in December 2001, mobilization 
of troops by India against Pakistan (called Operation Parakram), and then renewal of a 
composite dialogue process in early 2004.37  These events indicate that both the democratic and 
military regimes of Pakistan have acted as hawks and doves simultaneously vis-a-vis India. The 
same argument goes for the largest democracy-India, in its foreign policy towards Pakistan. In 
a word, the mentioned events establish no causal relationship between the internal make-up of 
India and Pakistan with their external behaviors.  
While applying the authoritarian peace thesis, realists critique that Indian and Pakistani 
democracies, like most of the democracies of Asia, are of illiberal nature. In the case of India, 
the dominance of a single party, the Congress party, for the first 3 decades gave the Indian 
democracy a one-party socialist texture. With the rise of BJP and other parties, the congress 
monopoly was broken. However, the rise of multi-parties failed to do away with authoritarian 
enclaves-- feudal, caste-laden, ethnic and bureaucratic-- within the Indian democracy. It is 
because of the presence of such enclaves that India is termed as a failed-democracy.  In the case 
of Pakistan, the illiberal element is comparatively more visible. During the direct military rules 
of general Ayub Khan (1958-1969), general Yahya Khan (1969-1971), general Zia ul Haq 
(1978-1988) and general Musharraf (2001-2008), Pakistani polity cannot be justified as 
democratic. The indirect influence of military through constitutional and unconstitutional 
means has remained so high that the civilian government of Pakistan is termed as pseudo-
democracy.  Now with such generalizations, the authoritarian peace thesis is also nullified as 
both the states have fought one another despite their authoritarian natures.  
India-Pakistan relations also defies other hypotheses of the democratic and authoritarian peace 
thesis like acquisition and use of nuclear weapons, the rate of military expenditures and 
weapons imports, border skirmishes, efforts for peacemaking, mutual-internal interferences and 
military standoffs. There exist no causality between liberal or non-liberal domestic values and 
other variables explained above. Wars, border skirmishes, military standoffs, peacemaking 
multilateral or bilateral efforts, rates of military expenditures, conventional and nuclear arms 
race and mutual interferences have remained constant despite the change in regime, leadership 
and political party.  Even there are instances when the same political party, the same 
democratically elected or military leader has blown both hot and cold with the adversary. The 
same personality with the same clique or regime is involved in wars, interventions and border 
skirmishes at one hand and has extended conciliation and friendship on the other. While 
nullifying the inside-out approach of liberalism, Neorealists argue that it is not the internal 
                                                 
36 Cohen, “India, Pakistan and Kashmir,” 43. 
37 Narayanan, “The India -Pakistan Dyad,” 174 
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make-up of the states that determine states outcome but the structure of the international system. 
It believes in an outside-in approach and by implication discards both the theories. For 
neorealists, state behavior is determined externally and as such, liberal or non-liberal values do 
not determine state behavior.38   
On the hypothesis of civil strife and terrorism, the democratic peace thesis seems qualified but 
only ostensibly. Realists concede that comparatively civil conflicts and terrorism have 
increased during or in the immediate aftermath of a military rule in Pakistan. The domestic civil 
strife and terrorism during the decades of the 1980s and 2000s augment the preceding argument. 
However, according to neorealists, the violence and terrorism in both the cases owe much to 
external systemic factors. In the former case, it was the fallout of the USSR’s intervention in 
Afghanistan and in the later case, it was the result of the American invasion of Afghanistan. 
Another logic being put forward by the realist school of thought is that India has allegedly 
supported Baloch separatist militias and terrorist groups. It has interfered in Baluchistan, FATA 
and KPK to generate civil conflicts and terrorism. On the other hand, Pakistan has allegedly 
supported different secessionist and terrorist groups in the erstwhile Khalistan movement, 
Kashmir, and Naxalites. Thus, there is no causal link between democracy or authoritarianism 
and civil strife and terrorism.  
Neorealists also discard the hypothesis of causality between domestic values and nuclear 
weapons acquisition and use. It was Indian democracy that introduced nukes to the region of 
South Asia.  It is argued that India acquired nuclear weapon predominantly due to partisan 
politics and status and prestige. Direct security threat was not a reason as the Chinese 
belligerence and threat had declined considerably in the 1990s and Pakistan neither tried to nor 
acquired nuclear weapons before India.  Yet, indirectly, Indian nuclear program could be 
assigned a security value.  According to offensive realists, states are offensive positionalist and 
are “gap maximizers”. In order to be secure, they try to establish global or at least regional 
hegemony. Armed with nuclear weapons, India’s relative power is enhanced as against its 
weaker and smaller neighbors and emerged as the dominant regional power. Most of the 
smaller states of the region did bandwagon India. Pakistan, being a relatively stronger neighbor 
complied with the defensive positionalist logic and tried to correct the imbalance created by 
Indian nuclear explosions by exploding its own. Therefore, Pakistan’s nuclear program, 
irrespective of domestic makeup, is the balance of power politics driven. Comparing the 
nuclear doctrine of India and Pakistan, Pakistan’s one is based on first use and Indian one on 
retaliatory use principle. This doctrinal difference of Indian exhibition of more restraint in 
nuclear use policy is not due to the more democratic government of India. In fact, such a 
difference is again due to the Indian relative position in the global structure.  States with 
conventional weapons superiority and greater relative strength projects self-restraint in their 
nuclear doctrines and mostly adopt retaliatory policies in nuclear use cases. China restrained 
                                                 
38 John Mearsheimer, (1998)  ‘The  false  promise  of  international  institutions ’ ,  in Michael  Brown  et  al.  (eds)  
Theories of War and Peace, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
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and responsible nuclear doctrine towards India and the Indian one towards Pakistan qualifies 
the (neo)realist logic of nuclear deterrence and nullifies nuclear extension of democratic peace 
thesis.  In a word, India-Pakistan relations with its important dimensions of war and peace, civil 
conflicts and terrorism, and nuclear dynamics defy the basic premises of republican liberalism.  
Trade-brings-peace thesis  
Trade between India and Pakistan is nominal and is not free due to tariff and non-tariff barriers, 
quotas, border controls, transport, visa problems and security issues. In 1948-49, 56 % of 
Pakistani export went to India which dropped to 4% in 1958.  In 1948-49, 50 % of India’s 
export went to West Pakistan and 80% to East Pakistan.39  However, in 2010 it was just 1 % of 
the total trade of India and little above 1 % for Pakistan. Economies of India and Pakistan are 
competitive as both are mostly exporting the same products like textiles, apparel, leather goods, 
footwear and other labor-intensive goods.40 According to Adam Smith and David Ricardo, the 
very spirit of free trade is the comparative advantage and functional specialization. Since both 
the nations are bestowed with the same natural resources, raw materials, skills and have same 
industrial or agricultural basis and are at the same stage of industrialization and development, 
therefore, their economies are necessarily competitive. India and Pakistan are low-income 
economies and are following import substitution strategies and will remain competitive unless a 
level of industrialization with a different product based is achieved. There are neither trade 
agreements between India and Pakistan, nor mutual FDIs or joint ventures.41 Though India has 
extended MFN status to Pakistan, Pakistan has refused to reciprocate unless the dispute of 
Kashmir is resolved.42 The agenda of India–Pakistan Chamber of Commerce and Industry is 
frozen since Kargil. It was revived in 2004 but went again dysfunctional in 2008 due to 
Bombay terror attack. According to Dale Copeland theory of trade expectations, economic 
interdependence will bring peace if the interdependent parties are sure of trade expansion in 
future.43 Realists opine that the charged political environment and competitive nature of the two 
economies make such a surety of trade expansion and the subsequent peace in future skeptical.  
Collective Security and integration theory 
Similarly, realists consider collective security and integration theory as Eurocentric and 
inapplicable in Asia.44 The success of a collective security (global or regional) depends upon its 
members’ fulfilment of commitments and consensual interpretation of an aggression or 
conflict-causing action.45 Such commitment and consensus are lacking amongst the nations of 
                                                 
39 Sridharan,  “Improving Indo-Pakistan relations,” 327. 
40 Sridharan, “Improving Indo-Pakistan relations,” 329. 
41 Sridharan, “Improving Indo-Pakistan relations,” 329. 
42 Chakma, “South Asia's Realist Fascination and the Alternatives,” 413. 
43 Sridharan, “Improving Indo-Pakistan relations,”325. 
44 Acharya, “Theoretical Perspectives,”13. 
45 Goldstein  and Pevehouse, International Relations, 90. 
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Asia in general and India-Pakistan in particular. UNO’s resolutions in the case of Kashmir are 
repeatedly disregarded by India and SAARC principles of non-interventions, sovereign equality, 
territorial integrity and pledge against terrorism are allegedly not respected by both Pakistan 
and India. In fact, mistrust and political disputes between the two leading nations have resulted 
in the sluggish performance of SAARC.46 Conforming to realist logic, both the powers have 
never let slip any opportunity off their hands of using UNO and SAARC as instruments of 
power politics.  
Complex interdependence 
According to realism, India -Pakistan relationship is still miles away from meeting the three 
conditions of the complex interdependence of the 1970s and present day globalization. Realists 
argue that no doubt, states of India and Pakistan are under the twin pressures of sub-state actors 
and supra-state actors. Yet state as a political entity is still dominant, coherent and its 
sovereignties intact. The Indian and Pakistani state still commands the loyalty of its people and 
provides for the security and welfare of the population it has circumvented. Its sovereignty, one 
of the four pillars of Westphalia state system, might be challenged by certain sub-state and 
supra-state entities and forces, yet both the states are striving hard to augment their 
sovereignties by resisting such pressures. A challenge to sovereignty doesn’t imply evaporation 
or dissolution of state as sovereignty cannot be absolute. Indeed, such challenges do not 
jeopardize the unity or coherence of the state. State as a political entity would lose its coherence, 
unity and sovereignty only when its population starts looking to other entities for their 
protection and welfare. The people of India and Pakistan still have stern faith in their states and 
unlike European union are not ready to hand over a bit of their states’ sovereignties to the 
constituent regional organization.  
Moreover, for realists, low politics still stands low in the foreign policies of India and Pakistan. 
A non-military issue including diseases, pollution, poverty, deforestation, climate change, 
global warming and water scarcity assumes importance only when it has direct implications for 
military or traditional security. For example, global warming or climate change is only a matter 
of concern when it affects the water supply. Water scarcity seems to be a matter of low politics; 
however, in the context of India and Pakistan, it has a direct correlation with high politics. 
Economies of both the nations are primarily agrarian and are water dependent thereby making 
water a strategic resource. Water scarcity has direct strategic implications for the security of 
India and Pakistan as well. India, being upstream, could use water as a bargaining chip for 
diplomatic leverage or a weapon against the maneuverability of Pakistani forces or rendering 
the Pakistani defence canals useless. In addition, lack of good governance, poverty, and 
corruption are much of the talked issues in India and Pakistan yet realists term these issues as of 
secondary importance. Terrorism in India and Pakistan cannot be considered a matter of low 
politics. It is, as per mutual allegations, not perpetrated by independent non-state actors. Instead, 
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it is state sponsored. Pakistan blames India for terrorism in KPK, FATA and Baluchistan. India 
blames Pakistan for helping LeT and other actors for terrorism in India. Therefore, the 
terrorism in India and Pakistan is but a proxy war fought by state-sponsored terrorist groups. It 
is not predominantly a non-state actor versus state war. It is a state versus state war but by other 
means.  
To boot, “military force is not used by governments towards other governments within the 
region, or on the issues when complex interdependence prevails”.47 According to realism, in the 
international relationship of India and Pakistan state to state military security threat has 
remained constant. So is the means of influence. Track II and III diplomacies are employed but 
to no avail. “Aman ki Asha” has failed and the “Samjhauta Express” derailed. A change in the 
means of influence has occurred but at doctrinal level. Pakistan’s alleged reliance on non-state 
actors, low-level less costly conflict, in Kashmir and elsewhere and Indian alleged response 
with the same coin in Baluchistan and elsewhere along the switching over to the “Cold Start” 
doctrine is not a change in the instrument of policy. The new doctrines still involve coercion 
and use of force but at different levels. 
International regimes  
For realists, the regimes between India and Pakistan have fallen prey to realpolitik.48 They have 
failed to build trust and stability; to spill over in other areas and in sustaining “a life of their 
own”. First, despite the fact that  institutionalized regimes with a staff and headquarter acquire 
greater strength and stability49 like EU, SAARC has failed in achieving its lofty objectives 
primarily due to, trust deficit and power politics between India and Pakistan.   Second, the 
regional trade regime has failed in its objective of establishing free trade between regional 
economies particularly India and Pakistan. Third, the IWT regime, a highly praised one, has 
failed to build trust and stability between India and Pakistan. It has failed to spill over into other 
issues particularly the Kashmir issue. For realists the treaty is guilty of naivety and idealism to 
the extent that whenever Kashmir issue is resolved as per the wishes of any of the three parties, 
the IWT is to be revised. Currently, the regime is under severe stress and strain due to climatic, 
hydrological, demographic variations and Indian construction of a large number of dams on the 
rivers allocated to Pakistan. Owing to such stress, many of the prominent water experts of the 
region have put forward the suggestion for installing a new treaty, Indus II.  Fourth, the CBMs 
between India and Pakistan are quite comprehensive; yet, their net result or spillover effect into 
actual confidence building is yet to be seen.  Last, IPI and TAPI as the components of a gas 
(energy) regime are sabotaged by mutual trust deficits and sensitivity to cumulative relative 
gains and fear of negative security fallouts. Pakistan since 1994 is rejecting such regimes and 
other economic relations with India as a part of its Kashmir policy of no India-Pak 
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rapprochement unless Kashmir issue resolved. As Pakistan fears of interlocking into a 
disadvantageous relationship with India so does India. India fears that the revenues generated 
by the gas regimes could be used by Pakistan to step up insurgency in Kashmir.50  
Absolute gains or relative gains? 
Neoliberals agree with neorealists that security dilemma compels states to be sensitive to 
relative gains yet it doesn’t mean that cooperation cannot take place between states. 51  
Neoliberals argue that a state’s sensitivity to relative gains is directly proportional to the 
intensity of the security dilemma in which it feels trapped. In other words, a state’s sensitivity 
to relative gains of the other state is directly proportional to the threat perception of one state 
towards the other state.52 Since nuclearization has amended for Pakistan's search for external 
security and now deterrence exists between India and Pakistan, therefore, such deterrence will 
enable Pakistan to engage in economic activities with India without fear of cumulative relative 
gain effect for the later. 53  (Neo)realists, however, disagree. While rivaling the neoliberal 
argument of states sensitivity to absolute gains, neorealists argue that states are more sensitive 
to relative gains than absolute gains.54  Similarly, arguing against the argument of reduced 
sensitivity to relative gains under the shield of nuclear weapons; neorealists emphasize 
Pakistan’s intact sensitivity to relative gains despite armed with second strike capable nukes.  
According to their logic, any interaction or regime by relative gains argument can only succeed, 
if it doesn’t upset the balance of power.55 India in this sense can be considered as offensive 
positionalist by maximizing its relative gains. However, Pakistan being, in search of the 
balance is defensive positionalist as it is defending its relative position. Therefore, according to 
realism, even in the face of MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction) sensitivity to absolute gains 
and thus cooperation possible between India and Pakistan is exuberance and sensitivity to 
relative gains or lack of trust a reality.  
Multilateralism  
(Neo)realists disregard multilateral institutions and multilateral efforts with the same rigor.56 It 
is observed that regional peace in Asia is based on bilateralism, instead of multilateralism and 
                                                 
50 Sridharan, “Improving Indo-Pakistan relations,” 331. 
51Duncan Snidal, ‘Relative gains and the pattern of international cooperation’, American Political Science  Review, 
85, September 1991, pp 701–726 in Sridharan,  “Improving Indo-Pakistan relations,” 323.. 
52 Sridharan, “Improving Indo-Pakistan relations,” 323. 
53 Sridharan, “Improving Indo-Pakistan relations,” 322. 
54Joseph M. Grieco, ‘Anarchy and the limits of cooperation’, in David Baldwin (ed),Neorealism and its Critics: the 
Contemporary Debate(New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp 116–142 in Sridharan,  “Improving Indo-
Pakistan relations,” 323. 
55 Sridharan, “Improving Indo-Pakistan relations,” 323. 
56Sorpong Peou, “Realism and constructivism in Southeast Asian security studies today: a review essay,” The 
Pacific Review, 15:1, (2002): 125. 
Cambridge Journal of China Studies 
77 
that regional groups in Asia serve as “adjuncts” to the politics of balance of power.57  In south 
Asia, SAARC has been used by India and Pakistan as an arena for the politics of balance of 
power. Indian official policy has always been that of employing bilateralism in its dealing with 
its neighbours. On the contrary, Pakistan in particular and other smaller states, in general, have 
always longed for multilateralism and have rejected bilateralism for its realpolitik spirit.  
CONCLUSION 
With the victory of liberal democracy and capitalism over authoritarianism and socialism in the 
1990s, liberalism won over realism in explaining international politics of most of the regions of 
the world. The same paradigm of liberalism is applied to explain the regional politics of South 
Asia including relations between India and Pakistan. However, India-Pakistan relations defy the 
logic of liberalism and still lends itself to the explanations being put forward by realism in 
many aspects. The two regional giants have fought wars both during military and civilian rules 
and suggest no causal relationship between domestic values and external behavior of the states. 
Trade between India and Pakistan is nominal and their economies are competitive in nature 
with no trade liberalization in sight in near future. Globalization has failed to diffuse loyalties 
or sovereignties of the two states and state is still coherent, unitary and sovereign in Indo-Pak 
subcontinent. Military security and means of influence still dominate other methods of 
influence. International regimes between India and Pakistan are numerous; however, instead of 
spilling over into other areas, they are vying for their existence in the face pummeling regional 
power politics. For India, bilateralism is still the official approach in dealing with its 
neighbours.  
According to neorealists, failure of India-Pakistan peace efforts owes much to structural 
constraints and the politics of (im)balancing. India is trying to offset the balance in her favor 
both through external and internal balancing. On the contrary, Pakistan is trying to foil Indian 
attempts by restoring the balance of power. She is spending 6 % of its GDP on internal 
balancing by modernizing its conventional and unconventional arsenals. On the front of 
external balancing, Pakistan has sought the alliances of USA and China since its existence.  
Similarly, against the liberal claim of military restraint, both the neighbors have repeatedly 
employed war as an effective mean of exerting influence in the wars of 1948, 1965, 1971, and 
1999 along with low-intensity warfare in Kashmir, mutual interventions and interferences. In a 
nutshell, against the claims of liberals, realism still reigns supreme in explaining relations 
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